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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should the State be allowed to appeal its own motion 
of dismissal? 
2. Did the trial court have sufficient reasoning to 
justify its ruling that Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) 
and §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983) proscribe identical conduct so 
that prosecution cannot be made under the higher penalty 
offense? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
vs. : 
STEVE GOMEZ and : Case No. 20520 
JACQUELINE GOMEZ 
Defendants/Respondents: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Steve and Jacqueline r-omez, were charged by 
information with two counts of wrongful use of a financial 
transaction card, a felony of the second degree under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1933). On January 31, 19S5, a hearing 
was conducted before the Honorable Judith Billings, Jud^e, in 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to consider the defendant's 
motion to reduce the offenses charged. At the conclusion of 
the hearing all charges against each defendant were dismissed. 
Statement of Facts 
The information filed against the defendants charged them 
with wrongful use of an American Express credit card on November 
27, 1984 (R.18-19). Counsel for the defendants made a motion to 
reduce the charges from second degree felonies under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) to either third degree felonies 
or class A misdemeanors under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501.2 (See 
Addendum A) (R.27,23,31-34). 
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On January 31, 1985 a hearing was conducted by Judith 
Billings, Judge for the Third Judicial District Court (T.l). 
The defendants! counsel presented arguments supporting the 
motion to reduce the charges (T.l-23). Witnesses were also 
present and ready to testify as to the value of the goods 
alleged to have been fraudulently obtained (T.14), necessary 
for the reduced charge. 
i 
Upon the ruling of the trial court that the motion to reduce 
the charges was proper, the State moved to dismiss the case rather 
than simply amend the information (T.14-16). After hearing 
argument the motion was granted and all charges were dismissed 
(T.26-28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
i 
Since the State's attorney moved to dismiss the charges 
rather than amend the information, the State should not now be 
permitted to appeal the ruling. The instances in which the 
State may appeal is restricted by statute and such an appeal 
should not be allowed from the State's own motion of dismissal. 
Even if this appeal is allowed by statute, the trial court 
was correct in its conclusion that charges should have been 
reduced. The statutory provisions clearly overlap and the 
defendants were thus entitled to the benefit of the lesser 
charge. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
SINCE THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS OFFERED BY i 
THE STATE, IT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE 
ALLOWED TO APPEAL THE GRANTING OF THAT 
MOTION. 
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The circumstances under which the State may anneal adverse 
rulings of the trial court in criminal cases have traditionally 
been limited by constitutional and statutory provisions. State 
v. Waddoups, 24 Utah Adv. Ren. 3 (Dec. 12, 1935). In State v. 
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1969) this Court held the State has 
no right to appeal except as expressly provided by statute. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure have codified the 
restrictions on State-initiated appeals in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 
(1953 as amended), which delineates a narrow category of cases 
in which the prosecution may take an appeal. (See Addendum B). 
The State in this case has attempted to circumvent the 
statutory restrictions on what it may appeal by requesting a 
dismissal at the hearing in the trial court and then relying 
on Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (c) (1) (1953 as amended), which 
permits an appeal of right by the State "from a final judgment 
of dismissal." To allow the State an appeal of right in such 
a circumstance would give the State an appeal of right from 
virtually every adverse pretrial order. 
The record in the instant case clearly revedls -".that the 
defendants submitted a "Motion to Reduce Offenses Charged From 
Second Degree Felonies to Third Degree Felonies." (T.3-4). The 
motion to dismiss the charges was proffered by the State, which 
did not wish to amend the information to charge the lesser 
offenses (T. 14-16). 
-3-
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4 
In State v. Waddoups, supra, this Court considered g 
a situation the same as the present case. Waddoups involved 
a criminal case which was dismissed upon a motion by the State. 
The motion to dismiss was proffered by the State only after it 
lost a pretrial ruling declaring a witness incompetent to 
testify and suppressing the witness's out-of-court statements. 
Id. at 3. 
— 4 
The Court concluded in Waddoups that allowing the State to 
move to dismiss after losing pretrial rulings "would be 
inconsistent with our law and would be a distortion of the 
I 
language and intent of the statute." Id., at 3. To allow otherwise, 
the State with all its resources and power would be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
I 
offense, thereby subjecting him to undue harassment. . 
In the present case, when the trial court ruled to reduce 
the offenses charged, the State should have either amended the 
i 
information and proceeded on the reduced charges or moved to 
have the case dismissed without instigating this appeal. The 
State has taken this appeal only in attempt to circumvent the 
4 
intent of §77-35-26 (c). Indeed, here as in Waddoups, the State 
is seeking to have this Court review not the order of dismissal 
but the underlying order which in this case would not be 
otherwise reviewable. The Court must not allow such a subterfuge 
and must dismiss this appeal as it did in Waddoups, supra. 
Any claim by the State that such a result is unfair or 
improper should be addressed by the state legislature and not 
-4-
i 
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this forum. This Court stated the position perfectly in State 
v. Kelbach,, 569 P. 2d at 1102, where it noted, "as a general 
proposition the law as established should remain so until 
changed by the legislature, whose perogative it is to make and 
change the law." 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS APPEAL WAS PROPERLY TAKEN, 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING"" 
THAT THE LESSER PROVISIONS OF U;C.A: §76-6 
506.2 WERE THE CHARGEABLE OFFENSES. ' " 
The defendants were each charged with two counts of Wrongful 
use of a Financial Transaction Card, both second degree felonies 
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) (R. 18-19). 
The illegal conduct prohibited by this section is : 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, 
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, 
or encodes magnetically or electronically 
any financial transaction card, or who with 
intent to defraud, signs the name of another 
or a fictitious name to a financial transaction 
card, sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument 
for the payment of money which evidences a 
financial transaction card transaction, is guilty 
of a felony of the second degree. 
While conduct under the above section is a second degree 
felony, the same acts of the defendants could have been charged 
under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983), which is classified 
as either a misdemeanor or a felony of the third degree. §76-6-
506.2 states that: 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud, 
obtain or attempt to obtain credit or 
-5-
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purchase or attempt to purchase goods, I 
property, or services, by the use of a 
false, fictitious, altered, counterfeit, 
revoked expired stolen, or fraudulently 
obtained financial transaction card, by any 
financial transaction card credit number, 
personal identification code, or by the use * 
of a financial transaction card not authorized 
by the issuer or the card holder; 
Before trial on the merits the defendants submitted a 
motion and supporting memoranda to reduce the charges filed . 
from a second degree felony to a third degree felony or a class 
A misdemeanor.(R.27,28,31-34) The basis of the motion was that 
since §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2 prohibit the same conduct -
that of fraudulently obtaining goods by use of a financial 
transaction card - the latter provision should apply since it 
carries the lower penalty. (See Addendum A). 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion (T. 28), but 
dismissed all charges. While the State obiected to the defendants1 
claim that §76-6-506.2 was the correct charge, it moved the court 
to dismiss the charges rather than reduce them. (T.15-16) (See 
Addendum C). 
The state now appeals, arguing that the defendants were 
< 
properly charged. First, the State argues that the elements 
of the provisions are different so that §76-6-506.1 is the correct 
charge. In the alternative, if the Court finds each section 
i 
to contain the same elements, the State argues §76-6-506.1 still 
applies as being more specific. The State's contentions are 
wrong for a number of reasons. 
< 
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It is well founded under either the federal or state 
judicial systems that an accused person is assured of the 
rational and evenhanded application of criminal law. Equal 
protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all who 
are similarly situated. State v. Bryan, 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 
17, (November 27, 1985) . 
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that there 
are significant differences between offenses. Unless statutory 
classificiations of crimes are based on differences which are 
real in fact, certain unlawful conduct might be subject to 
different penalties, depending on which statutory sanctions a 
prosecutor chooses to charge. People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233, 
1237 (Colo. 1983). Such laws allow a form of arbitrariness 
which is foreign to our system of equal protection. State v. 
Bryan, supra. 
Thus, in situations where two statutes proscribe the same 
conduct, courts allow whichever sanction carries the lesser 
penalty. State v. Bryan, supra; People v. Owens, supra; People 
v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1985); State v. Hales, 652 
P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982). In the trial of a criminal case, duplicity 
does not depend upon whether facts proved at trial are actually 
used to support conviction of both offenses charged, but 
rather turns upon whether necessary elements of proof of one 
crime are included in the other. State v. Hobson, 6 71 P.2d 1365, 
1372 (Kansas 1983) . 
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4 
In its brief, the State incorrectly concludes that the 
statutes do not contain the same elements. (See Appellant's 
brief at 14-15). 
A clear reading of §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2 reveals 
4 
that each contains the same elements. Under either provision 
a person must (1) have an intent to defraud another, by (2) 
the use of a stolen or altered financial transaction card, which 
I 
(3) evidences a sale, a rendering of services or other similar 
transaction. The claim by the State that §76-6-506.1 is 
distinguishable because it requires a "signing" while §76-6-506. 
i 
2 involves telephone-type sales where no "signing" takes place 
is clearly erroneous. 
Legislative enactments must be given effect according to their 
plain and obvious meaning. Statutory classifications of crimes 
must be based on differences which are real in fact and reasonably 
related to purposes of legislation. People v. Owens, suora. 
In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), this Court noted: 
The well-established rule is that a statute 
creating a crime should be sufficiently 
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence 
who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it. 
A fair and logical concomitant of that rule 
is that such a penal statute should be 
similarly clear, specific and understandable 
as to the penalty imposed for its violation. 
(citations omitted) Id. at 148. 
Shondel saw this Court reconcile a criminal statute making 
possession of LSD a misdemeanor with an overlapping statute 
which made the offense a felony. In searching for the applicable 
sanction the Court noted a provision in the act with the 
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harshest penalty which stated that any conflicting legislation 
was to govern, regardless of which penalty was harshest. This 
meant that only the provisions of the more lenient law applied. 
No such situation exists in the present case. 
Prior to the enactment of the present sections in dispute, 
the signing of a fraudulent or ficticious name in using a 
financial transaction card was clearly covered under older 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506 (repealed 1983). (See 
Addendum D). Indeed, the repealed section closely parallels 
the present provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (Supp. 1983). 
The only changes in the provision reflect the classfication of 
the crime according to the material value of goods involved. 
Thus, the provisions of each section of the statute require 
the same conduct, entitling the defendants to be charged under the 
provision with the lesser penalties. State v. Shondel, supra. 
At no point does the State's brief examine how the elements of 
the two sections differ or even how the defendants1 conduct 
could not have been charged under §76-6-506.2. 
The State position that §76-6-506.1 governs because it 
requires an actual "signing11 defies logic. The vast majority 
of credit sales involve a "signing" by the card user. To limit 
§76-6-506.2 to those instances where a card user orders goods 
over the phone will deny enforcement of that provision in the 
vast majority of fraudulent transaction card purchases. Such 
is not the "plain and obvious" meaning of §76-6-506.2. 
-9-
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I 
In the alternative, the state argues that even if the j 
elements of the sections are the same, the defendants should 
be charged under §76-6-506.1 since that provision is more 
specific. Such a position is also not supportable. * 
A view of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983) reveals 
that the focus of its provisions are toward the manufacture 
of false financial cards leaving use of an unlawfully obtained 
card to §76-6-506.2. Such an interpretatation is logical when 
viewing the penalties of each provision. Under §76-6-506.1 the 
manufacturer of potentially hundreds of stolen or altered cards 
would commit a second degree felony while under §76-6-506.2 
the user is guilty of a third degree felony or misdemeanor 
depending upon the value of the goods or services obtained. 
The Statefs view distinguishing the two sections makes 
its position untenable. Why punish a person who obtains 
goods by "signing" a receipt more severely than another person 
i 
who obtains the same goods by "using'1 a fraudulent card over 
the phone? No policy reasons can be given. Is there a greater 
danger to society when a defendant "signs" his name' while 
i 
"using" the fraudulent card instead of "using" the same card 
without ever physically signing the sales slip? For examnle, 
would a defendant who purchases an airline ticket by phone, 
giving only the numbers of a fraudulently obtained card, be 
less culpable than if the same defendant purchased the same 
ticket in person by signing a receipt? 
The State's position is even more untenable when viewing 
the legislative history of the laws1 recodification. Under 
the State view, the "more specific" provisions of §76-6-506.1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
increase the penalty from a third degree felony or misdemeanor 
to a second degree felony when the defendant "signs11 a receipt. 
Yet nothing in the legislative history supports such a 
conclusion. Even the State's brief fails to discuss any 
legislative history which supports its position. 
Thus, even though §76-6-506.1 includes the words "falsely 
signing evidence" of a financial transaction involving the card, 
the plain and obvious interpretation, when compared with §76-6-506.2, 
is that the former section cannot be read to include the defendants. 
Their use of a single financial transaction card is chargeable 
more specifically under the provisions of §76-6-506.2. 
The position advanced by the trial court, that the proper 
charges in the present case should be brought under §76-6-506.2, 
is further bolstered by a policy favoring the defendant in 
ambigious cases. Where neither the wording of the statute nor 
its legislative history points clearly to either meaning, courts 
apply the less harsh meaning. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 
169, 178-179 (1958) : State v. Shondel, supra. 
In Ladner v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court noted: 
When choice has to be made between two readings 
of what Congress has made a crime, it is 
appropriate, before we choose the harsher 
alternative, to require that Congress should 
have spoken in language that is clear and definite. 
We should not deprive criminal outlawry from 
some ambigious implication. [Citations omitted]. 
Id. at 205. 
While the title of §76-6-506.1 includes "Falsely Signing" in the 
illegal card transaction, such words have no definitional meaning 
in interpreting the act. People v Burns, 593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 
1979). Courts still consider the plain and obvious meaning of 
the statute. 
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4 
This policy of lenity means that courts should not interpret a 
criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places 
on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no 
more than a guess as to what the legislature intended. Utah 
Code Ann. §77-17-1 (Supp. 1980), a provision not mentioned in 
the Appellant's brief, provides that if there is even "reasonable 
doubt11 as to which of two or more degrees a person is guilty, 
they shall be convicted of "only" the lower degree (See Addendum 
E>-
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the appeal in this case 
should be dismissed or, in the alternative, the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this (j^ n day of January, 1936. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~7(j£~ e,\ x NANCY BERGES0N 
Attorney for Defendant 
\ X N K J <SW^ 
KHRIS HARROLD 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, hereby certify that 
four copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be 
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this I„ 
of January, 1986. 
_day 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
> V ^ v^^TuryX^ 
RIS HARR0LD 
L 
KHR 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
DELIVERED by 
day of January, 1986 
this 
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NANCY BERGESON (#303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-v-
STEVE GOMEZ 
Defendant 
MOTION TO REDUCE OFFENSE 
CHARGED FROM A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY TO A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY 
Case No. CR 85-3 
(Judge Billings) 
The defendant, STEVE GOMEZ, by and through his attorney 
of record, NANCY BERGESON, hereby moves this Court for an . 
Order reducing the crime charged from Wrongful Use of a 
Financial Transaction Card, a Second Degree Felony, to Attempted 
Wrongful Use of a Financial Transaction Card, a Third Degree 
Felony. 
Defendant further moves that the Defendant's trial 
i 
presently set for February 4, 1985, before this Court proceed 
on the charge of Attempted Wrongful Use of a Financial Trans-
action Card, a Third Degree Felony. 
DATED this <.;-J-5 day of January, 1985. 
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the 
ke County Attorney, 231 East Fourth Soul 
City, Utah, this «?*W " day of January, 1985 
Salt La uth, Salt Lake 
-V* 
; * • 
V?uv 
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NANCY BERGESON (#303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-v-
STEVE GOMEZ 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 
TO REDUCE OFFENSE CHARGED 
FROM A SECOND DEGREE TO A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
Case No. CR 85-3 
(Judge Billings) 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above 
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 31st 
day of January, 1985, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Third District Court Judge. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this day of January, 1985. 
't^r 
NANCY B^RGE^ON*/ 7^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
Cityf Utah, this ,y</^ day of January, 1985. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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JAN 51 i535 
ss^y 
NANCY BERGESON (#303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn< 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-v-
STEVE GOMEZ 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
REDUCE OFFENSE CHARGED 
Case No. 85-3 
(Judge Billings) 
In 1969, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the case of 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, (Utah 1969) that where the 
illegal conduct of a criminal defendant could be prohibited 
under two separate statutes with one crime proscribing a more 
severe punishment, the defendant is entitled to the benefit 
of the lesser punishment. 
The Defendant has been charged with the offenses of 
Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card, two Second Degree Felonies 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 506,1f Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). The illegal conduct prohibited 
uvider this section is: 
r 
"§76-6-506.1 Financial transaction card 
offenses — Falsely making, coding, or 
signing evidence of card transaction. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, 
counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, 
or encodes magnetically or electronically 
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a financial transaction card, or who 
w i intent to defraud, signs the name 
o another or a ficticious name to a 
f Miicial transaction card, sales slip, 
s ies craft, or any instrument for the 
p-vment of money vhich evidences a 
financial transaction card transaction, 
i guilty of a felony of the second 
d' jree . ,f (emphasis added) 
However, according to §76-6-506.5 the same conduct 
may be a Class A Misdemeanor if the value of goods obtained 
is less than $250, or a Third Degree Felony if the value of 
the goods obtained is greater than $250 but less than $1,000. 
Section 76-6-506.2, Unlawful Use of a Card, states that: 
"It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud. . . 
purchase or attempt to purchase goods, 
'.'••' property, or services by use of a false, 
ficticious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, 
expired, stolen, or fraudulently obtained 
financial card. 
Under these two statutory schemes, the same act — that 
of fraudulently obtaining goods by a use of a financial trans-
action card belonging to another — is prohibited. One carries 
a misdemeanor or third degree felony penalty; the other a second 
degree felony penalty. 
This Court, as the Supreme Court did in Shondel, supra, 
must reconcile the inconsistency. In Shondel, supra, the Supreme 
Court reconciled a criminal statute making possession of LSD a 
misdemeanor with an overlapping provision of Utah's Narcotic 
Drug Act which made the same offense a felony. In its ruling 
the Court stated: 
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I 
"A statute creating a crime should be 
sufficiently certain that persons of 
ordinary intelligence. . . may know 
how to conduct themselves in conformity ( 
with it." p. 148 
Further, in its ruling that the appellant therein was 
guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony, it said that: 
i 
"A penal statute should be clear, specific 
and understandable as to the penalty imposed 
for its violation." p. 148 
Finally, the ruling in Shondel, supra, is that: 
i 
"If there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable 
to an offense, an accused is entitled to 
the benefit of the lesser." p. 148 
In the matter before this Court, Defendant is alleged ^ 
to have purchased items from Honey Bear Toys and Nordstrom1s, 
valued at $111.00 and $294.51, respectively, by the use of an 
American Express card belonging to another person without that ^ 
person's consent. He is alleged to be a party to the signing 
of that person's name. A Defendant cannot be expected to know 
that he could be convicted of a second degree felony rather than
 { 
a third degree felony or a misdemeanor if he signs a transaction 
s l i p — because one of two conflicting statutes happens to 
mention "signing" while the other does not. "
 ( 
Under the law of the State of Utah, as set forth in 
State v. Shondel, supra, this Court should reduce the charges 
pending against the Defendant from second degree felonies to 
-3-
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> 
the applicable misdemeanor and rielony (third degree) and 
conduct Defendant's trial on those charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ______ day of 
it 
January, 1985. «• 
i 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney lor Defendant 
• k 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fpurth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this day of January, 1985. 
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77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals, (a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk 
of the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the order 
or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party 
or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) From the final judgment of conviction; 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant; 
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the supreme 
court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution: 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof invalid; 
or 
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence 
when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal 
would be in the interest of justice. 
(d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest of 
judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is given 
to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice shall be filed with the 
court. 
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the taking 
therof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The 
dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal can be, and 
is, timely taken. 
(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be given 
a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hearing, shall 
fail to appear for oral argument. 
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal appeals 
to the supreme court except as otherwise provided. 
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case 
shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after certifica-
tion by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is extended by 
the supreme court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death shall have 
prjority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
supreme court. 
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the judi-
cial council and approved by the supreme court relating to appeals from circuit 
courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(j) An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from all final orders and judg-
ments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with the provi-
sions of this rule. 
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered in 
the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as follows: 
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of the 
district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(2) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court shall 
transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original pleadings, 
all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case and the notice and undertak-
ing on appeal; 
(3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance with Rule 
27; and 
(1) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including any process 
required to enforce judgment. 
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MLMEDT 
NAN£«, BEE6ES0IF/ (#303 F and "s;>> 1-'^  'czi-r^Jizir" 
KHRI? HSRRCSSD (#1394> 
Attorneys for Defendants f^^ Li <-.--
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. i"'""v ""J 
333 South Second East *y~~>\ ^~~^ O '•' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 , C_0«=^afe-O-. K ^ d ^ " 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, :' FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff 
V. : 
STEVE GOMEZ and : Case No. CR-85-3 
JACQUELINE GOMEZ, : (Judge Judith M. Billings) 
Defendants : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on a Motion to Reduce the Offenses Charged in the Third Judicial 
District Court. The State was represented by Greg Bown, Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney, the defendant Steve Gomez was present 
and represented by Nancy Bergeson of the Legal Defender Assoc-
iation , and the Honorable Judith M. Billings was the Judge 
presiding. 
s Based upon the evidence and argument at the hearing on 
the Motion to Reduce the Offenses Charged, the Honorable Judith 
M. Billings makes the" following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendants are charged with two counts of Wrongful 
Use of a Financial Transaction Card, violations of Utah Code Ann* 
§76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1983), second degree felonies, in that they 
fraudulently signed sales slips evidencing credit card transactions. 
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2. Section 76-6-506.1 proscribes the following unlawful 
conduct: 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, counterfeits, 
falsely makes, embosses, or encodes magnetically or 
electronically any financial transaction card, or who 
with intent to defraud, signs the name of another or 
a fictitious name to a financial transaction card, 
sales slip, sales draft, or any instrument for the 
payment of money which evidences a financial trans-
action card transaction, is guilty of a felony of the 
second degree. 
A violation of this section is a second degree felony, punishable 
by the indeterminate term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
3. Defendants claim a right to be charged under Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-506.2 (1)(Supp 1983), which provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt 
v to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to purchase 
goods, property, or services, by the use of a false, 
fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, 
stolen, or fraudulently obtained financial transaction 
card, by any financial transaction card credit number, 
personal identification code, or by the use of a finan-
& cial transaction card not authorized by the issuer or 
the card holder. 
A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor, punishable 
by one year and/or $1,000 fine, unless the goods or services 
obtained exceed $250, in which case the offense is a felony of 
the third degree, punishable by the indeterminate term of 0-5 
years in the Utah State Prison. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.5 
(Supp 1983). 
4. Defendants claim that §76-6-506.1 and §76-6-506.2 
proscribe identical conduct on the facts of their case, therefore 
they are entitled to be charged with the offense carrying the 
lesser penalty. 
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5. The state contends that these statutes do not 
proscribe identical conduct, rather that §76-6-506.1 prohibits 
written misrepresentations involving a stolen credit card, 
while §76-6-506.2 prohibits oral misrepresentations and other 
attempts to use a stolen credit card. Thus, the defendant 
may be charged with the former and more specific statute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.1 and Utah Code Ann. 
§76-506.2(1) must be read to prohibit identical conduct, 
where the conduct alleged is the fraudulent signing of a 
sales slip evidencing a credit card transaction. 
2. Such a reading is mandated by a criminal 
defendant's due process right to be fairly notified of illegal 
conduct and the punishment which may be imposed for it. 
3. Such a reading is also mandated by a criminal 
defendant's right to equal protection of the laws, and his or 
her assurance that the law will be administered consistently 
and fairly by the County Attorney's Office. 
4. Based on the state's position that an adverse 
ruling by the court should be remedied by a dismissal rather 
than a reduction of the charges, and no objection voiced by 
the defendant, the court should order both counts dismissed. 
DATED this Lfc*1^ day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
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76-6-606. Fraudulent use of a credit card—"Credit card" defined.—(1) 
A person is guilty of fraudulent use of a credit card if he uses a credit card 
for the purpose of obtaining property, cash advance or services with intent 
to defraud and with knowledge that: 
(a) The card is stolen or forged; 
(b) The card has expired, has been revoked, or has been cancelled; or 
(c) For any other reason his use of the card or other device is un-
authorized either by the issuer of the card or by the person to whom it is 
issued. 
(2) As used in this section and in sections 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2 and 
76-6-506.3, "credit card" means a writing or other evidence of an under-
taking to pay for property or services delivered or rendered to or upon 
the order of a designated person or bearer. 
76-6-506.1. Fraudulent use of a credit card—Classification of offenses.— 
(1) If the aggregate value of property or services obtained by the fraudu-
lent use of a credit card within a six-month period in violation of section 
76-6-506 amounts to a sum of not more than $100, such violation shall 
constitute a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained 
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in viola-
tion of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more than 
$250, such violation shall constitute a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained 
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in viola-
tion of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $250 but not more than 
$l,00(j),isuch violation shall constitute a felony of the third degree. 
(4) If the aggregate value of property or services or both obtained 
by the fraudulent use of a credit card within a six-month period in viola-
tion of section 76-6-506 amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000 such violation 
shall constitute a second degree felony. 
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77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Convicted only on lowest. When it 
appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is reason-
able doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be 
convicted only of the lower degree. 
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